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INMATE ASSAULTS AND SECTION 1983 DAMAGE CLAIMS
LITTLE V. WALKER
552 F.2d 193 (7th Cir. 1977) cert. denied,
46 U.S.L.W. 3586 (U.S. Mar. 21, 1978) (77-121)
In recent years, federal courts have shown an increasing willingness to
examine state penal institutions for violations of prisoners' constitutional
right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.' With this growing
scrutiny, the courts have coupled an expansion of the concept of cruel and
unusual punishment.2 Under certain circumstances, for example, an assault
on an inmate by a fellow prisoner has been held to constitute cruel and
unusual punishment. 3 The underlying rationale is that prison officials have a
duty to protect the inmates from such assaults and failure to do so makes the
conditions of confinement so intolerable that it constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment.'
This duty of protection imposed on prison officials originated in cases
where federal court intervention was sought under section 19831 to require
the upgrading of overall conditions of state prisons. 6 Federal courts often
found state prison conditions to be so deplorable that confinement therein
subjected the prisoners to cruel and unusual punishment.7 Inadequate pro-
1. See Note, Recent Applications of the Ban on Cruel and Unusual Punishments, 23
HASTINGS L.J. 1111 (1972); Note, Sexual Assaults and Forced Homosexual Relationships in
Prison, 36 ALB. L. REV. 428 (1972).
2. See commentaries cited in note I supra.
3. E.g., Little v. Walker, 552 F.2d 193 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 46 U.S.L.W. 3586
(U.S. Mar. 21, 1978) (77-121); Woodhous v. Virginia, 487 F.2d 889 (4th Cir. 1973); Holt v.
Sarver, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971); Penn v. Oliver, 351 F. Supp. 1292 (E.D. Va. 1972).
4. See, e.g., Little v. Walker, 552 F.2d 193 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 46 U.S.L.W.
3586 (U.S. Mar. 21, 1978) (77-121); Woodhous v. Virginia, 487 F.2d 889 (4th Cir. 1973); Roberts
v. Williams, 456 F.2d 819 (5th Cir. 1972); Holt v. Sarver, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971); Coffin v.
Reichard, 143 F.2d 443 (6th Cir. 1944); Fore v. Godwin, 407 F. Supp. 1145 (E.D. Va. 1976);
Penn v. Oliver, 351 F. Supp. 1292 (E.D. Va. 1972).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
6. Section 1983 states in part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
7. See, e.g., Gates v. Collier, 501 F.2d 1291 (5th Cir. 1974); Holt v. Sarver, 442 F.2d 304
(8th Cir. 1971); Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 423 F. Supp. 1250 (D.N.H. 1976), modified, 561 F.2d 911
(lst Cir. 1976); Martinez-Rodriguez v. Jiminez, 409 F. Supp. 582 (D. P.R. 1976), aff'd, 551 F.2d
877 (1st Cir. 1977).
NOTES AND COMMENTS
tection of inmates from assaults by fellow prisoners was a primary basis for
such a finding. 8 The relief requested and granted in these cases was limited
to injunctive and declaratory relief. 9
This article will discuss the recent development of the concept that
prison officials may be liable for monetary damages to an inmate who is
assaulted by a fellow prisoner. The article will begin with an overview of the
initial class-action cases which established the prison officials' duty of
protection and an examination of later cases brought by individual prisoners
seeking protection from inmate assaults. In light of this prior case law, the
article will examine the recent decision of the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit in Little v. Walker.' ° In that case, the Seventh Circuit
sustained an inmate's complaint against prison and other state officials
which sought damages for assaults by fellow prisoners. The court held that
Little was entitled to recover damages if he could prove the assaults he
alleged. In reaching this decision, the Seventh Circuit considered the ques-
tion of inmate assaults as a violation of a prisoner's right to be free from
cruel and unusual punishment as well as the related question of whether
prison and other state officials were immune from such suits.
THE BEGINNINGS: CLASS ACTION INJUNCTIVE RELIEF DESIGNED To PROTECT
INMATES FROM ASSAULTS BY FELLOW PRISONERS
The idea that a prisoner has a right to be protected from his fellow
inmates is not a new one. As early as 1944, the Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit recognized the duty of the government to protect prisoners. ' It
was not until the 1970's, however, that under some circumstances the
failure of state prison officials to protect inmates from assaults by fellow
prisoners came to be viewed as a form of cruel and unusual punishment.
Such a constitutional violation gave rise to injunctive relief under section
1983.12
In 1971, in the landmark case of Holt v. Sarver,13 conditions in an
Arkansas prison were deemed so objectionable and "shocking to the con-
8. Gates v. Collier, 501 F.2d 1291, 1309 (5th Cir. 1974); Holt v. Sarver, 442 F.2d 304, 308
(8th Cir. 1971); Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 423 F. Supp. 1250, 1274 (D.N.H. 1976).
9. Section 1983 also provides for damage relief, but these cases were brought for the
purpose of upgrading conditions in the prisons primarily through the use of injunctions.
10. 552 F.2d 193 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 46 U.S.L.W. 3586 (U.S. Mar. 21, 1978) (77-
121).
It. Coffin v. Reichard, 143 F.2d 443 (6th Cir. 1944). The court stated: "The Government
has the absolute right to hold prisoners for offenses against it but it also has the correlative duty
to protect them against assault or injury from any quarter while so held." Id. at 445 (emphasis
added).
12. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). See text within note 6 supra.
13. 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971).
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science" as to require federal court intervention and supervision of the
whole prison. 4 A basis for this finding was the frequency of inmate
assaults. As the court stated: "Prisoners are frequently attacked and raped in
the dormitories and injuries and death have resulted . . . No adequate
means exist to protect the prisoners from assaults."' The court's decision to
intervene was also based on other facets of prison life such as the trusty
system and the isolation cells' 6 which, when viewed in conjunction with the
inadequate protection of inmates, were held to constitute cruel and unusual
punishment. ' 7 Holt was the first case to uphold federal court intervention in
the operation of a state prison. The court said that state prison conditions are
primarily the concern of the state legislature but stated that they had a duty
to intervene when conditions of confinement became so intolerable as to
constitute cruel and unusual punishment. '
8
The Holt case spawned numerous progeny. These cases also relied in
part on the frequency of inmate attacks as a basis for injunctive intervention
by federal courts into state prisons. For example, the Mississippi prison
farm at Parchman was put under federal court supervision in 1972 in Gates
v. Collier.'9 This decision was based on the inadequate protection of
inmates 20 as part of a totality of circumstances constituting the "infliction of
punishment on inmates Violative of the Eighth Amendment." ' 2' Other cir-
cumstances considered by the court were racial discrimination, the physical
facilities, the medical facilities, the trusty system, mail censorship and the
disciplinary rules in the prison.
22
14. Id. at 309.
15. Id. at 308.
16. Id.
17. The court stated:
Commissioner Sarver, who also served as superintendent of the Cummins unit, as a
witness frankly admitted that the physical facilities at both units were inadequate and
in a total state of disrepair that could only be described as deplorable. Additionally, he
testified that trusty inmates, some of whom were serving life or long term sentences,
constituted 99% of the security force of the prison. For the approximately 1000 inmate
population only eight free world (non-inmate) guards were employed and these guards
were poorly paid and lacked proper training. One hundred and fifty gun carrying
trusties, who control all the weapons at the prison, must be relied upon to guard and
protect the prisoners.
The trusties sell desirable jobs and also traffic in food, liquor and drugs. Prisoners
frequently become intoxicated and unruly.
Id.
18. Id. at 309. The court upheld the district court's remedy which required state officials
to move in "good faith and diligence" to upgrade conditions in the prison. Id.
19. 349 F. Supp. 881 (N.D. Miss. 1972), aff'd, 501 F.2d 1291 (5th Cir. 1974).
20. 349 F. Supp. at 828-29. The court noted that many of the inmates possessed knives or
handmade weapons, that at least eighty-five instances were in the record where inmates had
been assaulted by other inmates and that twenty-seven of these assaults were armed attacks in
which an inmate was either stabbed, cut or shot. Id.
21. 501 F.2d at 1309.
22. 349 F. Supp. at 887-92.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
In 1975, in McGray v. Sullivan,23 a federal court intervened in the
Alabama prison system stating that "the State of Alabama has violated the
constitutional rights of the plaintiff class by confining them in overcrowded
and understaffed prisons where their lives and safety are constantly in
danger.'" 24 This case also addressed conditions in punitive isolation such as
denial of writing materials, but the court focused almost entirely on the
inadequate protection of inmates as the basis for its holding. In 1976, both
Puerto Rico 25 and New Hampshire 26 prisons were also enjoined on similar
bases and were required to provide more adequate protection for inmates.
27
These cases established that assaults by fellow inmates on a prison-
wide scale might constitute violations of the prisoners' eighth amendment
rights. This signified a trend toward federal court intervention in state
prisons when state officials appeared indifferent to the prisoners' right to
tolerable living conditions. The courts stated repeatedly that prison mainten-
ance was a legislative function, but that federal courts could not allow the
legislatures to abdicate their responsibilities. The holdings in these class
action cases, that inadequate protection of inmates on a prison-wide scale
might amount to a constitutional violation by prison officials, became the
basis for claims by individual prisoners for such assaults.
CLAIMS BY INDIVIDUAL PRISONERS SEEKING PROTECTION
FROM FELLOW INMATES
As early as 1969, a Wisconsin district court held in Kish v. Mil-
waukee 28 that a complaint brought by several prisoners based on allegations
of assaults by fellow inmates might state a cause of action under section
1983. The plaintiffs alleged that they were beaten, burned and sexually
abused by fellow prisoners due to the defendants' failure to provide them
with adequate protection. The plaintiffs claimed that this subjected them to
cruel and unusual punishment.2 9 Considering the claim on defendants'
23. 399 F. Supp. 271 (S.D. Ala. 1975), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 509 F.2d 1332 (5th Cir.
1975).
24. Id. at 274. The court noted that partially as a result of this overcrowding and
understaffing, homosexual activity abounded, and had on several occasions resulted in serious
injury or death to inmates. Id.
25. Martinez-Rodriguez v. Jiminez, 409 F. Supp. 582 (D.P.R. 1976), aff'd on appeal, 551
F.2d 877 (1st Cir. 1977).
26. Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 423 F. Supp. 1250 (D.N.H. 1976), modified, 561 F.2d 911 (Ist
Cir. 1976).
27. In the Nadeau case, the court focused on numerous factors to support its injunction,
such as, lack of exercise and showers, access to medical services, religious services, and
library, as well as the inadequate protection. 423 F. Supp. at 1266-74. In Martinez-Rodriguez,
the court was primarily concerned with inmate safety. 409 F. Supp. at 594.
28. 48 F.R.D. 102 (E.D. Wis. 1969), aff'd, 441 F.2d 901 (7th Cir. 1971). The original
defendants were the County of Milwaukee, the County Board of Supervisors, and the Sheriff.
29. Id. at 103.
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motion for summary judgment, the district court noted that by placing
prisoners in a cell with inmates who abused them physically, prison officials
and the county might have violated the prisoners' right to be free from cruel
and unusual punishment.30 On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit dismissed the claim without affirming or denying the idea that
inmate assaults could amount to a constitutional violation. 3' The Seventh
Circuit held that the cause of the assaults was the physical conditions of the
jail facility, such as overcrowding, rather than any acts or omissions by the
sheriff. The court distinguished Holt as involving only injunctive relief and
held the sheriff not liable for damages, 32
One of the first cases delineating what an individual prisoner must
prove to sustain a claim for protection under section 1983 based on an
assault by a fellow inmate was Penn v. Oliver.33 The court in Penn cited the
Holt case in support of the proposition that "there exists a constitutional
right of inmates to be afforded at least some degree of protection from
attacks by fellow inmates." 34 In this case Penn was involved in an alterca-
tion which also involved an inmate named Huff. Following the fight, Huff
was placed in maximum security for over a year. When he was returned to
the general inmate population he engaged in another fight with Penn. It was
not clear who was the aggressor. Penn alleged that prison officials failed to
protect him adequately. 35 While dismissing the complaint the court set out
the proof required to sustain a section 1983 claim against prison officials
based on their failure to protect a prisoner from assault by fellow inmates.
The court stated: "there must be a showing either of a pattern of undisputed
or unchecked violence or, on a different level of an egregious failure to
provide security to a particular inmate, before a deprivation of constitutional
rights is stated."
'36
The requirement of showing a pattern of violence on a prison-wide
level seems to flow from the analysis used in finding an eighth amendment
violation in the earlier injunction cases such as Holt. The second of the
30. Id. The court held that the County Board could not be sued under section 1983.
However, they refused to dismiss the claim against the Sheriff who had actual control of the
premises. Id.
31. Kish v. County of Milwaukee, 441 F.2d 901 (7th Cir. 1971).
32. Id. at 905. This reasoning does not really distinguish Holt. In Holt, the officials were
held responsible for conditions such as overcrowding and the violence which resulted from
such conditions. The failure to adequately protect the inmate was the constitutional violation,
regardless of the actual cause of the assault. The fact that the court granted injunctive relief
only does not change the fact that it found inadequate protection could amount to a constitu-
tional violation.
33. 351 F. Supp. 1292 (E.D. Va. 1972). The court never specified the type of relief Penn
sought.




court's tests was new, however. This would allow a cause of action for an
individual inmate even wthout allegations as to general prison conditions.
The court, however, found that Penn had not satisfied either test. 37 In doing
so, the court noted that he had alleged only an isolated incident of violence
and, therefore, there was no constitutional violation. The court explained
that due to the violent nature of the men who inhabit prisons, officials could
never prevent all acts of violence. This reasoning seems to underlie the
requirement that general conditions be alleged or, on the other hand, that
something more than a merely negligent failure to protect an individual
inmate be alleged.
In Breeden v. Jackson ,38 the prisoner Breeden was voluntarily placed
in protective segregation because he feared for his safety due to threats of
harm from other inmates. In his section 1983 suit for damages, Breeden
alleged that the deprivation of normal prison privileges 39 while so confined
constituted cruel and unusual punishment.4 There were no allegations of
assaults by other inmates. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
dismissed his claim, focusing only on the loss of privileges issue and finding
that the losses alleged did not amount to a constitutional deprivation. 4'
Judge J. Braxton Craven dissented,4 2 stating that prison administrators have
a responsibility to protect life, and that "they may not condition such
protection on relinquishment of earned prison privileges." 43 He stated that
requiring an inmate to give up his prison privileges in order to be assured of
protection from fellow inmates violated the prisoner's constitutional right to
protection. He said that the state must provide a reasonably safe place of
imprisonment."4
Only a year later, the Fourth Circuit ruled directly on a claim of failure
to protect an individual inmate from assaults. In Woodhous v. Virginia,'5
37. Id.
38. 457 F.2d 578 (4th Cir. 1972). Although not as important as other cases in the devel-
opment of the duty of prison officials to protect inmates, this case played an important role in
the decision of the district court in Little v. Walker. For this reason, the case is discussed in
some detail. Judge Craven's dissent was adopted by the majority in the Fourth Circuit in
Woodhous v. Virginia, 487 F.2d 889 (4th Cir. 1973). It is important to note that these cases were
decided in 1972 and 1973, respectively, because those dates relate to the time period involved in
Little's claim.
39. The Virginia prison in question did not differentiate between those segregated volun-
tarily and involuntarily with regard to loss of privileges. Thus, inmates in segregation out of fear
for their safety were subjected to the same restrictions as those in segregation for disciplinary
purposes.
40. 457 F.2d at 579.
41. Id. at 581.
42. Id. (Craven, J., dissenting).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 581-82.
45. 487 F.2d 889 (4th Cir. 1973).
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the plaintiff alleged that he was not adequately protected from assaults by
other inmates. 46 Woodhous was afraid of reprisals since he had gone to the
aid of a young prisoner who was being sexually assaulted. The district court
found that he had not been attacked and dismissed his claim.47 The court of
appeals reversed,/s reasoning that a prisoner has a right "to be reasonably
protected from constant threat of violence and sexual assault by his fellow
inmates and he need not wait until he is actually assaulted to obtain
relief." 4 9 The court cited the Holt case in support of this proposition, but
that case seems inapposite since Holt was a class action where many of the
inmates had actually been subjected to assaults. The court seems to have
followed Judge Craven's dissent in Breeden in imposing upon prison
officials a duty to provide a reasonably safe place of imprisonment, a duty
which the federal courts will enforce.
The court's analysis in Woodhous mirrored Penn. In Woodhous, the
court stated: "While occasional isolated attacks by one prisoner on another
may not constitute cruel and unusual punishment, confinement in a prison
where violence and terror reign is actionable. "50 Thus, under the Woodhous
analysis, a prisoner could state a cause of action under section 1983 without
having been personally victimized by an assault, provided conditions in the
prison in general created an unreasonable risk of harm. This analysis seems
to follow from the class action injunction cases which also required intoler-
able general conditions as a prerequisite to federal court intervention.
In the 1976 case of Fore v. Godwin,51 plaintiffs Fore and Harrison
alleged that they were inadequately protected from violence and sexual
assault when housed in a city jail. They did not allege that they had
personally been attacked but rather that such attacks did occur. The court
stated that the claim was actionable because it was based on general
conditions rather than isolated attacks.52 The court held that since the
plaintiffs did not allege attacks personally, their claims would be limited to
injunctive relief.53 The court then noted that the two prisoners had been
transferred to other facilities and that, therefore, any claim they had for
injunctive relief had been mooted. The court dismissed their claim.
46. Id. As in the Penn case, the court was unclear as to what type of relief the plaintiff
sought. See note 33 supra.
47. 487 F.2d at 890.
48. Id. at 889.
49. Id. at 890.
50. Id. The court did not mention the second Penn test, "the egregious failure to provide
security to a particular inmate." See text accompanying note 36 supra.
51. 407 F. Supp. 1145 (E.D. Va. 1976).
52. Id. at 1147. The court did not elaborate as to what the plaintiff alleged regarding
general conditions.
53. Id. This expresses what seemed implicit in the Woodhous case. See text accompany-
ing notes. 45-50 supra.
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The Penn, Woodhous and Godwin cases stand for the proposition that
if something approaching a "reign of terror" due to inmate assaults exists in
the prison, an individual prisoner may sustain a section 1983 injunctive
claim for relief on the basis of a constitutional deprivation, even without
being attacked. Dicta in Penn also indicated that an egregious failure to
protect a particular inmate might be actionable.-' The courts appear to be
concerned with general conditions of prison life as opposed to relief to an
individual inmate. The purpose of the decisions was to require that inmates
subjected to the threat or actuality of inmate violence on a regular basis be
adequately protected by prison officials. Court intervention in these in-
stances where the prison officials and the legislature failed to act seems
necessary to stimulate corrective action. The courts repeatedly emphasize
the impossibility of federal courts actually managing state prisons but also
emphasize that no longer will that consideration prevent them from acting to
protect prisoners being forced to live in constant fear of attack.
None of the foregoing cases actually upheld a damage award; they
either granted injunctive relief or held that a cause of action might be stated,
given proper facts. Both of the courts in Penn and Godwin dismissed the
prisoners' claims. The court in Woodhous remanded, but since Woodhous
did not allege that he was actually attacked, it seems clear relief would be
limited to an injunction ordering protection. 55 Other courts have dismissed
claims for damages against prison officials based on inadequate protection
from inmate assaults. 56 These claims have been denied for failure to allege a
sufficient deprivation of the right to protection 57 and on the grounds of
immunity of state officials.58 These were precisely the issues faced by the
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Little v. Walker,59 which
involved a claim for money damages based on inmate assaults.
54. 351 F. Supp. 1292, 1294 (E.D. Va. 1972).
55. In Godwin, the court expressly held that without any actual attack a prisoner would be
limited to injunctive relief. 407 F. Supp. at 1147.
56. See, e.g., Hampton v. Holmesburg Prison Officials, 546 F.2d 1077 (3d Cir. 1976);
Curtis v. Everette, 489 F.2d 516 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 995 (1974); Williams v.
Field, 416 F.2d 483 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1016 (1970); Grillo v. Sielaff, 414 F.
Supp. 272 (N.D. I11. 1976); Parker v. McKeithen, 330 F. Supp. 435 (E.D. La. 1971).
57. E.g., Grillo v. Sielaff, 414 F. Supp. 272 (N.D. I11. 1976). The court found that Grillo's
allegations regarding a fight with another inmate only constituted an isolated incident which did
not give rise to an action under section 1983. Id. at 275.
58. E.g., Hampton v. Holmesburg Prison Officials, 546 F.2d 1077 (3d Cir. 1976) (the court
held that plaintiff failed to allege the intentional conduct or deliberate indifference by prison
officials necessary to state a claim); Curtis v. Everette, 489 F.2d 516 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
416 U.S. 995 (1970) (the court required intentional action by officials to sustain a section 1983
claim). See also Bogard v. Cook, 405 F. Supp. 1202 (N.D. Miss. 1975).
59. 552 F.2d 193 (7th Cir. 1977).
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Prior to Little, courts in the Seventh Circuit, like those in other
jurisdictions, had dismissed such damage claims.6' In fact, the sole case
from any jurisdiction upholding a damage award against prison officials
based on inmate assaults was Roberts v. Williams. 61 In that case, Roberts
was blinded when an untrained inmate who was being used as a guard
unintentionally discharged a shotgun in his face. The prison officials'
liability was based on a Mississippi common law negligence rule in addition
to constitutional grounds.62 In Little, the Seventh Circuit became the first
court to sustain a damage claim solely on constitutional grounds against
prison officials under section 1983 based on a failure to adequately protect
an inmate from assaults by fellow prisoners.
Little brought suit alleging constitutional deprivations suffered while
he was a prisoner at the Illinois State Penitentiary at Stateville, Illinois. He
sought damages from various prison and state officials under section 1983.63
The basis of Little's claim was that while part of the general inmate
population he was not reasonably protected by prison officials from repeated
"acts and threats of physical violence, sexual assaults, and other crimes
perpetrated by other inmates.' ,6 Little also alleged that he was ordered to
work in certain areas of the penitentiary which were controlled by gang-
affiliated inmates. Fearing for his safety, plaintiff accepted placement in
"Segregation Safekeeping" status, which resulted in the denial of numerous
privileges because defendants did not differentiate between disciplinary and
protective segregatees. 65 While in this status, ostensibly for his protection,
plaintiff alleged that further indignities were inflicted upon him. He claimed
that gang-affiliated inmates refused to serve him meals unless he performed
unnatural sex acts through the bars of his cell. 66 Plaintiff also alleged that his
60. Claims were denied in at least four instances. See United States ex rel. Miller v.
Twomey, 479 F.2d 701 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1146 (1974); Adams v. Pate, 445
F.2d 105 (7th Cir. 1971); Grillo v. Sielaff, 414 F. Supp. 272 (N.D. III. 1976); Schyska v. Shifflet,
364 F. Supp. 116 (N.D. I11. 1973).
61. 456 F.2d 819 (5th Cir. 1972).
62. The fact that Roberts was fourteen years old when the incident occurred and in jail on
a charge of petty larceny may have been emotional factors in the court's granting relief.
63. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). The defendants included the Illinois Department of Correc-
tions, its director and former director, the Governor of Illinois, the warden of the Stateville
Penetentiary and his predecessor, the Superintendent of the Stateville Prison, the administra-
tive assistant to the warden, the chairman of the Stateville Institutional Assignment Committee,
and six members of the Disciplinary Committee of the Stateville Prison. 552 F.2d at 195.
64. 552 F.2d 193, 194 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 46 U.S.L.W. 3586 (U.S. Mar. 21, 1978)
(77-121).
65. This is similar to the situation in Breeden v. Jackson, 457 F.2d 578 (4th Cir. 1972). See
notes 38-39 and text accompanying notes 38-44 stpra.
66 552 F.2d at 195.
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cell block was seized by rebellious inmates, during which time homosexual
gang rapes were inflicted upon inmates, and much of plaintiff's personal
property was destroyed. 67 Nonetheless, the prison officials continued to
house plaintiff in the same area. Little asserted that defendants knew or
should have known of the deprivations he suffered and that failure to protect
him from these deprivations amounted to the imposition of cruel and
unusual punishment.
The district court granted defendants' motion to dismiss. 68 That court
focused on the issue of plaintiff's subjection, while in protective segrega-
tion, to the same loss of privileges as inmates in segregation for disciplinary
reasons. The court stated that defendants, as state officials, could be liable
for damages under section 1983 if "they acted with such disregard of
plaintiff's clearly established constitutional rights that their actions could not
reasonably be characterized as being in good faith ' 69 or if they were
motivated by actual malice.7° The deprivations for which Little sought
damages occurred between May, 1972, and September, 1974, when Little
was transferred to another institution. Thus, the district court held that Little
had to allege a constitutional right which was "clearly established" during
that period. Citing Breeden v. Jackson,71 the district court found that
defendants had 'not failed to apply the law as it existed at that time.
Therefore, defendants had not acted with disregard of any "clearly estab-
lished" constitutional rights of the plaintiff. The court also held that the
defendants were not motivated by actual malice. The defendants were found
to be immune from damages under section 1983 for these reasons.
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit chose not to focus on
plaintiff's loss of privileges, but rather on his alleged mistreatment at the
hands of his fellow inmates.72 They found that even the Breeden majority
would have held that plaintiff's alleged treatment amounted to a constitu-
tional deprivation. 73 Therefore, his constitutional right to protection from
assault by fellow inmates was "clearly established" by the time in question
67. Little did not directly allege that he was a victim of these rapes but rather that he was
subjected to "acts and threats of physical violence" during the seizure. Brief for Appellant at
11-12, Little v. Walker, 552 F.2d 193 (7th Cir. 1977).
68. See 552 F.2d at 196 for a discussion of the district court decision.
69. Id.
70. Id. The district court was applying the test for establishing the immunity of state
officials enunciated in Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975). See text accompanying notes
91-97 infra.
71. 457 F.2d 578 (4th Cir. 1972). The Breeden majority had held that loss of privileges by
voluntary protective segregatees did not amount to a constitutional violation. See text accom-
panying notes 38-44 supra.
72. 552 F.2d at 193.
73. See text accompanying notes 38-44 for a discussion of Breeden.
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and that if on remand Little could prove that he was "deliberately deprived"
of this constitutional right, his damage claim would be sustained.74
The Little Court's Approach To Inmate Assaults
The Seventh Circuit's requirements in Little for stating a claim for
damages against prison officials for an inmate assault differ from the
approach taken by courts in earlier cases. The court's approach focused on
two interrelated issues. First, when do assaults by fellow inmates constitute
cruel and unusual punishment; and second, what is the scope of a prison
official's immunity from damage liability for such assaults.
75
In its response to the first issue, the Seventh Circuit in Little expanded
the concept of inmate assaults as cruel and unusual punishment. The court
did not specifically require that Little allege either general conditions or
even an egregious failure to protect a particular inmate. 76 The court indi-
cated clearly that under the alleged facts, Little would be entitled to dam-
ages. The court said that "Little's alleged treatment was so unreasonable as
to be characterized as vindictive, cruel or inhuman as to be intolerable in
fundamental fairness. " 77 The court defined what constituted this mistreat-
ment by stating that "Violent attacks and sexual assaults by inmates upon
the plaintiff while in protective segregation are manifestly 'inconsistent with
contemporary standards of decency.' Deliberate indifference to these hap-
penings constitutes the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain proscribed
by the Eighth Amendment. "7
The court relied on Holt as support for the proposition that "under the
Eighth Amendment prisoners are entitled to protection from the assaults of
other prisoners." ' 79 Rather than requiring the allegations that Penn and
Woodhous sought from individual inmate plaintiffs, the court propounded
its test based on "contemporary standards of decency" and "fundamental
fairness.''80 Further, the court stated positively that if Little proved his
allegations concerning abuse by fellow inmates, he would have stated
sufficiently the deprivation of a constitutional right.81
74. 552 F.2d at 197-98. The deliberate deprivation of constitutional rights is a requirement
for finding a state official not to be immune from damage liability under Wood v. Strickland,
420 U.S. 308 (1975).
75. See text accompanying notes 91-97 infra.
76. These were the required allegations in the Penn-Woodhous line of cases. See text
accompanying notes 33-54 supra. It is arguable that Little alleged such a failure to protect him,
but the court never makes any mention of a need to so allege.




80. Id. (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976)).
81. Id. at 197.
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Little, therefore, is the first case to hold directly that an individual
inmate might be denied the constitutional right to be free from cruel and
unusual punishment by being subjected to inmate assaults. The court
concluded that attacks and sexual assaults upon inmates, particularly those
in protective segregation, are constitutionally repugnant and inmates have a
constitutional right to be protected from such assaults. 82 Once an inmate has
sufficiently alleged the deprivation of this right, the remaining burden he has
in order to establish damage liability will be to show deliberate indifference
on the part of prison officials to overcome their qualified immunity. 83
Official Immunity
Official immunity was the second problem faced by the court in Little.
Although the court held that Little had sufficiently alleged a deprivation of a
constitutional right, that alone was not enough to establish damage liability
against prison officials under section 1983. The court also required that
plaintiff prove deliberate indifference to his plight by the prison officials.8 4
This is because under section 1983, state officials have a qualified immunity
from damage liability for actions taken within the scope of their official
duties. 85 The limits of this immunity have been the subject of much litiga-
tion in recent years.
In Pierson v. Ray,86 the Supreme Court found that in enacting section
1983 the Congress did not intend to abolish all common law immunities.
Therefore, the Court concluded that the common law absolute immunity for
judicial officers still existed under section 1983.87 The Court also held that a
policeman had a qualified immunity. If he made an arrest in good faith
based on probable cause and the person was later proved innocent he would
be immune from damages. Similarly, if he made an arrest based on a statute
which he reasonably believed to be valid but which was later found uncon-
stitutional, he would also be immune from damages. 88 Thus, the police-
man's immunity under section 1983 is based on his good faith and the
reasonableness of his actions.
82. The "intolerable in fundamental fairness" test encapsulates a feeling of moral out-
rage, but it does not clearly define the extent of the attacks which will amount to a constitution-
al deprivation.
83. This is the second part of the immunity test enunciated in Wood v. Strickland, 420
U.S. 308 (1975). Without clearly stating so, the court was applying the Wood test to Little's
damage claim. See text accompanying notes 91-97 infra.
84. 552 F.2d at 197.
85. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
86. 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
87. Ia. at 557.
88. Id. at 555.
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In Scheuer v. Rhodes,89 the Supreme Court again confronted the issue
of immunity of state officials from damage claims. The Court held that the
governor, officers in the state's national guard, and a state university
president were not absolutely immune from liability, but they were immune
if they acted in good faith. The Court defined good faith as "the existence of
reasonable grounds for the belief formed at the time and in light of all the
circumstances. '"90 This good faith belief affords a basis for qualified im-
munity of executive officers for acts performed in the course of official
conduct. The Court reasoned that this immunity was necessary to avoid
discouraging effective action by state officials charged with a wide range of
responsibility and discretion.
Most recently, in Wood v. Strickland,9 the Supreme Court considered
the scope of the immunity of school board members. The Court held that
liability for damages for any action which is found to have been violative of
a student's constitutional rights would "unfairly impose upon the school
decision-maker the burden of mistakes made in good faith in the course of
exercising his discretion in the scope of his official duties."92 Therefore, the
Court held that school board members, like other state officials, were
entitled to a qualified immunity from damage liability under section 1983.
The Wood case enunciated a test for determining the immunity of a
state official. The Court stated that the official is not immune from liability
for damages under section 1983 if "he knew or reasonably should have
known that the action he took within his sphere of official responsibility
would violate the constitutional rights of the student affected, or if he took
the action with the malicious intention to cause a deprivation of constitu-
tional rights." 93 As noted in the dissent, this standard seemed to impose a
higher standard of care than was previously imposed under section 1983. 94
The Wood standards were made applicable to prison officials by the
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Knell v. Bensinger.95 The court
in Little followed Knell and applied the Wood immunity test to the officials
involved. Under this test, as applied in Little, recognition that an inmate has
89. 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
90. Id. at 247-48.
91. 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
92. Id. at 319.
93. Id. at 322.
94. Id. at 327. (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell felt that the proper standard for
determining the qualified immunity of a government official was "whether in light of the
discretions and responsibilities of his office, and under all of the circumstances as they
appeared at the time, the officer acted reasonably and in good faith." Id. at 330.
95. 522 F.2d 720 (7th Cir. 1975). The Supreme Court also recently used the Wood
standards in discussing a prison official's immunity in Procunier v. Navarette, 98 S. Ct. 855
(1978).
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some constitutional right to protection from other prisoners does not mean
that an official will be liable for any inmate attack. First, the inmate must
show that the attacks amounted to a constitutional deprivation under the
fundamental fairness standard enunciated in Little.96 The Seventh Circuit
relying on Woodhous, Holt and Kish, held that Little had a clearly estab-
lished right to protection from fellow inmates. As noted, the court found that
the attacks and sexual assaults which Little alleged were sufficient to state a
violation of this right to protection.
Once this is established, the Wood immunity standards raise the issue
of what constitutes such disregard of this constitutional right to protection
that the defendant cannot be characterized as acting in good faith.97 Accord-
ing to the Seventh Circuit, "deliberate indifference" to the attacks on Little
would be enough to meet the Wood standard.98 The facts alleged were
plaintiff's repeated complaints to the prison officials and their knowledge of
the attacks he suffered. Defendants forced plaintiff to remain in an area
where an inmate seizure had occurred during which inmates were at-
tacked. 9 Plaintiff also alleged that defendants were aware he was forced to
perform unnatural sex acts to receive meals from the inmates who served
them."0 The court held that since under the facts alleged defendants should
have known that their actions would violate Little's established constitution-
al right to protection, they did act with such disregard of that right as to not
be reasonably characterized as acting in good faith. Therefore, they would
not be immune from liability. This is a reasonable application of the Wood
test because if defendants were aware of Little's plight and did nothing, they
were by definition "deliberately indifferent" to his right to protection and
they should not be allowed to escape liability.
ANALYSIS
The problem of inmate assaults, particularly sexual assaults, on fellow
prisoners is one of the largest facing our prison system.101 Many weak or
nonviolent inmates are forced to suffer brutal indignities by other inmates
and live in constant fear of assault. " Often the victims are in such fear of
96. The treatment must be "so unreasonable as to be characterized as vindictive, cruel or
inhuman as to be intolerable in fundamental fairness" or "manifestly inconsistent with contem-
porary standards of decency." 552 F.2d at 197.
97. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
98. 552 F.2d at 197.
99. Brief for Appellant at 11-12, Little v. Walker, 552 F.2d 193 (7th Cir. 1977).
100. Id. at il.
101. See Note, Sexual Assaults and Forced Homosexual Relationships in Prison, 36 ALB.
L. REV. 428 (1972).
102. Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970). In Holt, the court stated that some
of the inmates were in such fear of assault that they came to the front of the barracks and clung
to the bars all night. Id. at 377.
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retaliation that they will not complain, or if they do they are placed in
protective segregation as was Little. There, they must relinquish most prison
privileges with no real guarantee of safety. These are the conditions to
which the courts are responding in supporting the prisoners' right to protec-
tion.
The growth in judicial concern for prisoner rights, and the right to
protection in particular, reflects the growing belief that citizens do not
surrender all their constitutional rights merely because they happen to be
incarcerated. The prisoner's welfare is completely in the hands of the state,
represented by its prison officials. The state is clearly responsible for prison
conditions and prisoner management. The Little court indicates that the
state's responsibility extends to protecting inmates from other prisoners.
The court reasoned that punishment administered by the state is cruel and
unusual if the conditions of confinement include attacks by other inmates.
State officials have a duty to protect prisoners from such attacks. There are
problems, however, with the federal courts' intervention in state prisons in
an attempt to- act as a guarantor of prisoner safety.
The most obvious problem is one of scale. The court in the usual case is
presented with a claim from one institution 1°3 or from an individual in-
mate. 10 Even if the court is successful in fashioning relief for an entire
prison or single inmate, the problem of assaults remain in all the other
institutions and for all the other inmates. Also, the courts are not equipped to
supervise the operation of entire state prison systems, let alone all state
prison systems, to prevent constitutional abuses. Rather, the courts' func-
tion seems to be to act as a prod for prison administrators and the legislature.
Hopefully, judicial recognition of the prisoners' right to protection will
force the legislatures to move to ensure that protection.
The decision in Little v. Walker puts the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit in the forefront of this move for prisoner protection and also
raises some questions. As noted, the court has announced that the right to
protection is a clearly established constitutional right and that it is violated if
the inmate's treatment by other inmates is "intolerable in fundamental
fairness. "'05 While such a broad standard is easy for the courts to enunciate,
it does not really put prisoners or officials on notice of what treatment will
amount to a constitutional deprivation. The many attacks and sexual assaults
Little alleged were sufficient. The question remains, however, how frequent
and of what nature such assaults must be. The court's use of the fundamental
103. See, e.g., Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970).
104. See, e.g., Little v. Walker, 552 F.2d 193 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 46 U.S.L.W.
3586 (U.S. Mar. 21, 1978) (77-121).
105. 552 F.2d at 197.
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fairness test is clearly a correct application of the law. 1° However, the
Seventh Circuit might have defined the test more clearly rather than merely
using language from a recent Supreme Court opinion. The Penn approach of
requiring either prison-wide conditions approaching a reign of terror or an
egregious failure to protect a particular inmate to establish a constitutional
deprivation was more certain and would guarantee more regularity in appli-
cation. The Seventh Circuit's standard may allow for more flexibility, but it
can only lead to more litigation to define its boundaries.
Another problem with this case is the upholding of the concept of a
damage award against prison and other state officials based on inmate
assaults. 07 Should a prison official be held liable if he knows assaults are
committed and yet due to lack of funds he is unable to adequately protect
those in his charge? 0 8 The problem of assaults in prisons seems solvable, if
at all, only by legislative action in the form of increased appropriations to
hire more and better trained guards and to upgrade facilities to improve the
quality of life in the prisons. A more immediate source of relief may be for
the state to make a more determined effort to prosecute the inmates who
perpetrate the assaults. 109 The court in Little was performing its function
and applying the law, but its damage approach is like throwing grains of
sand into the ocean in the vain hope of filling it up. The actual effect on
prisons will be small, unless the court spurs legislative action.
On the other side, the Wood standards applied in Little leave it up to
the plaintiff to prove that the officials were "deliberately indifferent" to the
violations of his right to protection. Actually proving this indifference and
the assaults alleged may be practically impossible for the individual prison-
er, particularly if his own testimony is his only evidence, as is likely. The
making of such claims may also provoke retaliation by other inmates or
unscrupulous administrators.
One hopeful possibility arising from the Little decision is injunctive
relief for individual prisoners, requiring officials to protect them more
adequately. For such relief, an inmate will have only to prove that he was
106. This is the test for cruel and unusual punishment applied by the Supreme Court in
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
107. The court left it up to the district court on remand to determine which defendants,
including the Governor, would be liable. In a footnote, they seem to indicate that only those
defendants with actual or constructive knowledge of the events should be liable. 552 F.2d at 198
n.10.
108. For example, should the Governor be liable if he vetoes a bill, on valid fiscal grounds,
which would appropriate more money for guards and better prison facilities, since he knows
that attacks occur and that his vetoing of the bill will allow those attacks to continue. The Wood
"good faith" test would seem to militate against such a result.
109. See Chicago Tribune, Feb. 10, 1978, § 4, at 1, col. 2, where the foreman of a grand jury
investigating conditions in Cook County Jail said that the lack of prosecution of offenders was a
principal problem in inmate assaults. Id.
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deprived of his constitutional right to protection under the "fundamental
fairness" standard. "0 If he is not seeking damages, there is no need to prove
the deliberate indifference of the officials."' This of course raises the
problems of the court's assuming an essentially legislative function, prison
operation, and opens the door for a flood of complaints of this nature.
However, it assures prisoners of a forum where they may seek protection
and, hopefully, stimulate legislative action. The bottom line is that the court
will no longer allow the state to treat its prisoners as less than human beings
deserving human dignity.
Finally, the Seventh Circuit in Little has provided and applied a
straightforward approach to the problem of section 1983 suits seeking
damages from state officials. This approach will have impact beyond the
area of prisoner rights. The plaintiff in any section 1983 damage suit must
now prove that: (1) he was deprived of a clearly established constitutional
right; and (2) that the official acted with either bad motive or with such
disregard of the plaintiff's clearly established constitutional right that his
action cannot reasonably be characterized as being in good faith. This will
clearly be the framework for the court's analysis of all section 1983 damage
claims and the Little case provided an excellent opportunity for the court to
apply it.
CONCLUSION
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has provided a very
rational approach to the difficult question presented in Little v. Walker. The
court's approach firmly incorporated the Supreme Court's immunity test
from Wood v. Strickland as the standard to be used in the analysis of a
prisoner's claim for damages against prison officials. By clearly defining the
framework for its analysis, the court demonstrated the approach it will take
to all damage claims against state officials.
The court has also modified the concept of a prisoner's constitutional
right to protection from other inmates. The court has enunciated clearly that
a prisoner does have a constitutional right to protection. Under the Seventh
Circuit's analysis, the prisoner has been deprived of this right if his treat-
ment at the hands of fellow prisoners has been "fundamentally unfair" or
"manifestly inconsistent with contemporary standards of decency." This
approach switches the focus from general conditions in the prison to the
110. This opens the door to spurious claims by prisoners who are only too aware of the
developing law and have little to do but draft new complaints.
11. If a prisoner brought suit seeking injunctive relief and prison officials continued to
allow him to remain under conditions where his right to protection was denied, this in itself
might be deemed sufficient under Little to support a claim for damages, as the officials would
clearly have notice of the inmate's plight. Therefore, the mere filing of suit might be enough to
spur action.
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treatment received by the individual inmate. This seems only logical be-
cause he is claiming damages based on his mistreatment rather than general
prison conditions.
The Wood test as applied in Little requires that the prison officials
must have been "deliberately indifferent" to the violations to be liable for
damages. The inmate has a cause of action if the official disregards his being
assaulted by other inmates. Yet, the official is protected if he acts in good
faith to protect the prisoner. This is a logical and appropriate balance.
Obviously, the problem of inmate mistreatment of fellow inmates will
not be solved by a solitary award of damages from a prison official to an
inmate. However, the Little case opens up the possibility of injunctive relief
for individual inmates or on an institution-wide scale in the Seventh Circuit.
The inquiry in such cases will be solely whether the inmate's treatment at
the hands of fellow inmates was so intolerable as to violate principles of
fundamental fairness.
The ultimate solution to the underlying causes of inmate violence, such
as overcrowding, clearly can only be left to the legislature. The Little case
merely serves notice that the federal bench will no longer allow prison
officials to sit passively by and allow inmates to terrorize their fellow
inmates. This is clearly a step in the right direction, toward a more just and
humane prison system.
GREGORY A. THORPE
